Real life applications of yardstick regulation frequently refer to historical cost data. While yardstick regulation cuts the link between rms' own costs and prices rms may charge in a static setting, it does not do so in a dynamic setting where historical cost data is used. A rm can inuence the price it will be allowed to charge in the future if its behavior today can aect future behavior of other rms that determines the price this rm will be able to charge later on. This paper shows that, assuming that slack, ination of costs, is benecial to rms, a trade-o between short term prot through abstinence from slack and the benet of slack in (innitely) many periods arises. A ratchet eect that yardstick regulation was meant to overcome can occur and rms can realize positive rents because of the use of historical cost data, even if rms are identical. Equilibria with positive slack can exist without any collusion between rms or threat. Moreover, this problem is more severe if the rm with the lowest costs of all other rms instead of the average rm is the yardstick.
Introduction
Natural monopolies are frequently subject to regulation. As`natural' competition does not force prices towards a perfect competition outcome, often regulatory agencies jump in to`regulate' prot, prices or revenue. Under traditional rate of return regulation, allowed prot of a rm is linked to capital employed. The well known result of Averch and Johnson (1962) is that this regulation provides incentives for the rms to employ an inecient input mix and not to engage in cost minimizing behavior in other words, to produce with some slack. Incentive regulation is meant to address this issue. Price cap regulation, originally suggested by Littlechild (1983) , decouples costs incurred and prices allowed to be charged by xing or capping prices, no matter what costs are. Thus, the rm becomes the residual claimant of all costs not incurred and so, has a strong incentive to produce without slack if prot is worth more to the rm than slack is. Necessarily, the question of how the price cap should be dened arises. If the regulator takes into account prots made and costs incurred, the incentive structure is much less clear cut, as e.g. Train (1991) points out. The basic idea of yardstick regulation, as described by Shleifer (1985) , solves this problem by using information on costs of other comparable rms to dene prices a rm is allowed to charge. In a static world and in every period prices and costs for each individual rm are, as a consequence, completely independent of each other. In the absence of collusion, yardstick regulation fosters ecient production, especially if rms and circumstances of production are very similar. Tangerås (2002, p. 232 ) summarizes: the regulator is able to extract all surplus from rms and reach full eciency if technologies are perfectly correlated. This paper shows that this property does not carry over into a dynamic setting if historical cost data is used.
A rm can inuence the price it is allowed to charge in the future via its eect on the behavior of other rms. Consequently, without any collusion a ratchet eect can occur under yardstick regulation using historical cost data as a result of individual and independent decision making of rms.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: In a simple dynamic model with three rms, we show that every rm can aect the price it is allowed to charge if this price is a function of the costs of the other two rms in the period before.
By this we highlight a feature of real world applications of yardstick regulation that has not received much attention both in academic literature and in regulatory practice: historical costs are used to dene constraints. Furthermore, we compare two variants of yardstick regulation: either the rm with the lowest costs of all rms but the evaluated one, or the average of the other rms can be used as the yardstick.
Intuitively, orientation at the best seems to be the tougher form. However, we show that choosing this scheme might lead to higher slack and a worse situation for society.
A well cited example of the use of average performance for regulation is the Prospective Payment System of Medicare (originally Shleifer, 1985) , whereas e.g. the German regulation for electricity networks follows a best practice/frontier approach.
Yardstick mechanisms are also used in the regulation of, for instance, the water industry in the UK (Cowan, 2006) or railway services in Japan (Mizutani et al., 2009 ).
1 Real life examples of yardstick regulation usually have in common that the price of a service oered is set and known before customers use the service. For instance, at the start of a regulatory period prices or constraints are dened based on observations of costs from the regulatory period before.
Aspects of yardstick regulation that are subject to debate or known drawbacks are collusion among rms (e.g. Tangerås, 2002; Potters et al., 2004) , investment behavior (e.g. Dalen, 1998; Sobel, 1999) and the potential inability of a regulator to commit to a regulatory scheme for the future (Faure-Grimaud and Reiche, 2005) .
Moreover, quality might be adversely aected under incentive regulation in general, which makes additional quality regulation necessary (see Sappington, 2005 , for a survey). Firms may also lack comparability necessary for the implementation of yardstick regulation (e.g. Laont and Tirole, 1993) . In this paper, we abstract from these issues and show that the desired outcome, i.e. ecient production, might still not be reached.
We derive our results in a dynamic model with three rms, an innite horizon and discrete time. As we are interested in the long run eects of the use of historical cost data under yardstick regulation, we focus on the analysis of resulting steady state equilibria. In order to formalize the absence of collusion and Folk Theorem arguments in our result, we dene punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibria: these are Markov-perfect steady state Nash equilibria such that rms do not (coordinatedly) choose a uniform slack that is individually optimal for every rm only because of other rms choosing this slack. We show that such equilibria with positive slack, i.e. inecient production and positive rents for rms, can exist.
Furthermore, we show that the highest slack that can exist in such a steady state equilibrium is higher if the rm with the lowest costs of all other rms instead of the average of the other rms is used as the yardstick.
In this paper, the modelling of slack, i.e. lack of costly eort, diers from a major part of the contributions to the debate on incentive regulation, represented especially by Laont and Tirole (1993) or Laont (1994) : in these models costly eort reduces 1 While this paper focuses on yardstick regulation of rms, in particular natural monopolies, relative performance measures can be used in a broader range of settings where asymmetric information structures are present. For instance, voters may judge incumbent politicians relative to the performance of other politicians in other jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995) or workers might be paid based on their ordinal position of performance among their colleagues (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) . costs of production. In our model, ineciency costs, slack, are added to real, necessary costs of ecient production and producing with slack oers nonmonetary benet to the rms. The instantaneous payo function used is very similar to the one in Blackmon (1994) . This is done as it allows for straightforward interpretation of the results and explicitly models the idea that yardstick regulation is meant to solve the ineciency problem of traditional rate of return regulation. However, this is not a substantive dierence but only a dierent way of presentation.
A key structural element of our model is the time horizon used. In models considering only two periods, the eect driving our results is not present: under yardstick regulation using historical cost data current choices of a rm do not aect the price this rm can charge in the current and the next period. The direct eect is only visible from the next but one period onward. Like Meran and Hirschhausen (2009) we use dynamic programming techniques to account for long run eects of the decisions of rms. However, we come to diering conclusions. The main dierence between their model, which is expanding the model of Shleifer (1985) , and our approach leading to these diering results is that Meran and Hirschhausen (2009) do not allow the rms to benet from slack and consequently rms do not gain from keeping costs high.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the model setup. In Section 3 all possible punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibria are characterized, existence is proven and the two regulatory schemes are compared with respect to equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
2 Description of the model
Firms
There are three rms, labelled j = i, o, x, each producing a homogeneous output normalized to one. The output is bought by the consumers. For example, one could think of demand for electricity which is very inelastic with respect to price or demand for some crucial medical treatment. These rms could be thought of as catering three comparable regions with electricity grids as local monopolists. The only way they interact in`competition' is via the regulation imposed on them. In every period, the regulator assigns a price to each of the rms. Each rm must not charge more than this price for its output, so the regulator denes a price cap which is equivalent to a revenue cap under the assumption of completely inelastic demand. As demand does not react to price in this setting, all rms always charge the maximum price they are allowed to.
Whereas the rms' output is directly observable the underlying cost structure is unknown to the regulator. Each rm veriably reports its costs to the regulator who cannot distinguish between`real' necessary cost, C > 0, and slack, S j t ≥ 0, dened as additional costs due to inecient use of resources, and only observes the sum of both. C does not change over time and is the same for all rms. This is equivalent to assuming that the regulator correctly and completely accounts for all heterogeneity between rms and (exogenous) circumstances of production.
2 Each rm chooses its slack and may choose dierent slacks in dierent periods. For instance, slack can be interpreted as a lack of (costly) eort from managers, oversized oces or all kinds of`unnecessary' costs that might occur under rate of return regulation. As slack is inecient production by denition, the regulator maximizing the utility of society desires to avoid all slack without explicit consideration of a target function.
If rm j chooses a positive slack in period t, it realizes a nonmonetary utility denoted by B(S j t ). B is twice continuously dierentiable with B(0) = 0, 1 > B > 0 and B < 0. Accordingly B(S j t ) < S j t for all S j t > 0. If the sum of necessary costs and slack is smaller than the price the rm is allowed to charge, it additionally realizes a prot. The marginal benet from an additional unit of prot is constant and normalized to 1. Increasing prot and decreasing slack are two sides of the same coin as they add up to a constant: the price a rm charges less necessary costs. Hence, it is sucient to explicitly consider just one of the two as the other one emerges as the residual. The instant payo function of rm j is in every period given by
Firms care about prot and slack only. They discount next period's utility with δ, 0 < δ < 1, and maximize their intertemporal utility:
Firms need to break even at all times, so that C + S j t ≤ P j t . Slack is`expensive' not only from the perspective of the regulator or society: one marginal unit of additional prot always results in higher instantaneous utility for the rm than an additional marginal unit of slack would. The only reason why S j t > 0 could be an optimal choice of j is that it can aect the price j is allowed to charge in later periods.
We consider an innite number of periods in order to avoid unrealistic eects 2 In Shleifer's (1985) one-period model accounting completely and correctly for heterogeneity leads to the ecient equilibrium. of last rounds in which all slack is zero.
3 Every period there is only one choice per rm to be taken: the slack the rm chooses. The regulatory rule and break even condition are common knowledge, and so are the prices of the current period.
Using this knowledge, rms can anticipate how their choice of slack will aect future behavior of the other rms. Accordingly all three current prices are state variables for all j.
Strategies are anonymous, so if rms o and x initially do the same, rm i reacts to a change in behavior of o with constant behavior of x just as it would react to a change vice versa. Simple renaming o into x and x into o does not aect the behavior of i. Firms simultaneously choose their slack every period without observing the current choice of the other rms.
Only Markov-perfect strategies 4 are considered, so rms react to the state variables they observe and do not care about the history of states. We exclude collusion between rms as well as arguments based on Folk Theorems, 5 which can be seen as a form of collusive behavior, from the analysis as yardstick regulation is obviously highly vulnerable to collusion. This paper does not strive to oer solutions for this issue but proceeds to show that even if all collusive behavior can be avoided, uncoordinated individual utility maximization by rms can result in equilibria with positive slack. Therefore we restrict our attention to strategies that are not based on collusion or coordination and exclude that rms coordinatedly choose a uniform slack that is otherwise not an optimal choice for any individual rm.
Regulatory rules
The price a rm is allowed to charge is derived from costs realized by the other two rms in the previous period. We separately look at two regulatory schemes: average yardstick regulation under which average costs of the other rms are used as the yardstick, and frontier yardstick regulation or best practice regulation under which only the costs of the best performing rm of all others, i.e. the rm with the lowest costs, are the yardstick. For example, the price that rm i is allowed to charge in period t + 1 is accordingly a function of the slack o and x are choosing in t in both cases:
3 It is easy to show that a nite horizon and the corresponding backward solution will result in zero slack starting in the very rst period. 4 The corresponding concept of Markov-perfect equilibria goes back to Maskin and Tirole (1988 a and b) .
5 See e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for a description of trigger strategies and Folk Theorems.
Under frontier yardstick regulation the price is given by
and under average yardstick regulation by
Regulatory rules for the other rms and periods are dened analogously. Since necessary costs are constant, C can be factored out under both regulatory regimes and can be normalized to zero. This is equivalent to interpreting P i t+1 as the amount by which the price i may charge in t + 1 is greater than necessary costs C. 6 In the rst period of yardstick regulation, prices are exogenously given: they could be derived from some regulatory rule that was in place before yardstick regulation was implemented.
Lemma 1. Under both regulatory rules, slacks and prices converge to a steady state in which all rms choose the same slack and realize zero prots due to regulatory mechanics. This slack may be zero.
Proof. See appendix.
As long as not all rms choose the same slack and this slack is equal to the price they are allowed to charge (C is normalized to zero), the highest slack chosen in t cannot be chosen by any rm anymore in t + 2 at the latest. Accordingly, there is a downward drift of the highest slack, whenever rms choose diering slacks. As slack cannot become negative, convergence is assured.
Equilibrium analysis
It is easy to show that equilibria with very high slack could exist, given initial prices are suciently high, if rms punish other rms' uncooperative behavior. Unilateral punishment conditioned on other rms' past behavior is precluded, by restricting our attention to Markov-perfect strategies. However, rms could follow a Markov-perfect strategy which includes extreme slacks, e.g. zero slack, if they observe a specic vector of prices. From the proof of Lemma 1, it directly follows that under frontier yardstick regulation, every rm can force all rms into a steady state equilibrium with zero slack by choosing zero slack once. This is the worst possible steady state 6 Necessary costs C remain, however, unknown to the regulator.
from the perspective of all rms. Therefore, if at least one rm chooses zero slack, all other rms can choose zero slack, and thereby the highest feasible instantaneous prot without adversely aecting future payos. Consequently, the best response to other rms choosing an extreme slack could be choosing the same extreme slack.
In the spirit of the Folk Theorem (a threat of )`joint mutual punishment', i.e. rms each choosing an extreme slack because of other rms choosing this slack, could be used to implement equilibria with very high slack. Such equilibria would involve aspects of a coordination game.
The analysis of corresponding equilibria does not oer much additional insight as yardstick regulation is known to be highly vulnerable to collusion. Joint mutual punishment, that no rm would do unilaterally, can be seen as a form of collusion.
To this end, we explicitly exclude all sorts of joint mutual punishment, collusion or coordination from our analysis and show that steady state equilibria with positive slack that are`punishment-free' can still exist. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the subset of Markov-perfect equilibria satisfying the following denition:
and f x (P t ) be the Markov-perfect strategies of rms i, o and x respectively, and P t be the vector of prices valid for rms i, o and x in period t.
In a punishment-free equilibrium, rms do not choose a uniform slack that is optimal if and only if other rms also choose this slack and that is not an optimal choice of slack for any rm if all other rms choose higher slacks. Thus, whenever rms choose the same slack, for at least one rm, this slack must remain optimal if all but this rm choose higher slacks instead. In other words, we exclude that rms choose a uniform slack that is for each rm optimal only because of other rms doing so.
Below we implicitly dene an optimal value of slack each, denoted by S * , that maximizes intertemporal utility given current prices under the respective regulatory regime that can characterize a steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, we derive a unique level of slack, S M * under frontier yardstick regulation and S A * under average yardstick regulation, which oers the highest intertemporal utility for the rms under the respective regime and that can exist in a punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium, given that prices are suciently high. As will be shown,
and S A * by
Equations (6) and (7) summarize the respective tradeo between the marginal benet of reducing slack in the current period and the corresponding marginal costs from adversely aecting future payo each rm faces every period under both regulatory schemes.
We show that every S * [0, S M * ] and S * [0, S A * ], under frontier yardstick regulation and average yardstick regulation respectively, can occur in a punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium, provided that the initial prices are high enough. Conversely, no other slack is possible in such an equilibrium.
Optimal slack
Assume there exists a steady state equilibrium consistent with the triple of punishment-free Markov-perfect strategies of rms i, o and x, denoted by f i (P t ), f o (P t ) and f x (P t ) respectively. By denition, strategies need to be optimal in equilibrium.
Firms decide on their slack considering their discounted utility in all periods to come given they decide optimally in all future periods given future states. The Principle of Optimality 7 is used to nd the resulting optimal level of slack for rm i. So rm i solves the following maximization problem: describe the optimal slack of rm i given P t , i.e. f i (P t ) is the solution to (15).
Inserting this into (13) leads to:
Taking the derivative to the left with respect P i t we nd with Envelope Theorem:
Analogously we nd
and
Updating (19) and (20) by one period yields
Plugging (21) and (22) into the FOC (15) leads to
In equation (23), we clearly see the consequence of the use of historical cost data under yardstick regulation: The price that rm i can charge in the future is inuenced by its behavior today. The choice of slack of i in t does not only dene its instantaneous payo, implicitly represented by F 2 (P i t , S i t ), but also aects the prices o and x can charge in t + 1 via the regulatory rule, R o (S i t , S x t ) and R x (S i t , S o t ) respectively. Firms o and x choose their slack in t + 1 based on the state they observe and under the restriction that they have to break even according to their strategies, f o (P t+1 ) and f x (P t+1 ). The slacks o and x choose in t + 1, via the regulatory rule, then aect P o t+2 and P x t+2 and determine the price i is allowed to charge in t + 2, P i t+2 . These three prices are the arguments of the value function of i and in period t, rm i discounts the eects in t + 2 with δ 2 .
From Lemma 1, we know that in every steady state all rms choose the same slack. Thus, starting from a steady state unilateral reduction of the slack of i aects the price o and x may charge in the following period the same way so that
From Lemma 1 it also follows that, due to regulatory mechanics, in all steady states all rms realize zero prots, i.e. all rms choose the slack that is equal to the maximum price that each rm may charge. So, starting from a steady state a marginal unilateral reduction of the slack of i in t leads to P o t+1 = P x t+1 < P i t+1 . Following a punishment-free strategy, the two other rms, o and x, will under both regulatory schemes reduce their slack the next period by exactly the resulting marginal reduction of their respective price, given the price they face is not higher than the unique optimal slack S M * and S A * , respectively. We formalize this in the following Lemma, considering reductions of slack only for both regulatory regimes:
Lemma 2.
(i) Frontier yardstick regulation:
(ii) Average yardstick regulation:
Intuitively, Lemma 2 means the following: Starting from a steady state, a rm has to reduce its slack if the price that this rm can charge is reduced as it needs to break even. Given that the rm would not voluntarily unilaterally deviate from the steady state equilibrium, it cannot increase its intertemporal payo by deviating even more than necessary. The fact that another rm also has to reduce its slack by the same amount does not cause additional eects in this case. 8 We extensively deal with the derivatives of the regulatory rules in the appendix.
With Lemma 2, equation (24) reduces to
To show how the solutions to this equation dier under both regulatory schemes we need to look at them separately.
Frontier yardstick regulation. From Lemma 1 it followed that in all steady state equilibria rms choose the same slack and the slack is equal to each rm's price due to regulatory mechanics. Therefore, in such a steady state i will choose the same slack every period, i.e. S i t+1 = S i t = S * . Every period i could deviate by reducing its slack. 9 So, S * must solve the FOC in every period. Now assume i marginally reduces its slack in t. From the FOC, it directly follows that it cannot be optimal for i to choose a higher slack in t + 1 than in t. With S i t < S i t+1 , the slacks of o and x would have to be smaller than the one i chooses in t + 1 from the regulatory rule and the break even constraint. Accordingly, in t + 1 the left hand side derivatives of the regulatory rule with respect to the slack of i drop to zero if S i t < S i t+1 . It follows that S i t < S i t+1 cannot describe an optimal strategy of i: the FOC would not hold in t + 1 as F 2 (P i t , S i t ) = B − 1 is smaller than zero and λ i t+1 is nonnegative from the complementary slackness conditions. We conclude that i marginally reduces its slack in periods t and t + 1, so that S i t = S i t+1 < S o t = S x t . From the regulatory rule, equation (4), the prices o and x may charge in t + 1 decrease to P o t+1 = P x t+1 = S i t and given S i t = S i t+1 , there is no additional eect on P o t+2 = P x t+2 from the forced change in the behavior of o and x in t + 1: The prices o and x may charge in t + 2 are given by P o t+2 = min(S i t+1 , S x t+1 ) and P x t+2 = min(S i t+1 , S o t+1 ). So, if o and x decrease their slack in t + 1 to S i t = S i t+1 , they neither change P o t+2 nor P x t+2 . Consequently, in this situation the left hand side derivatives of the regulatory rule are given by
10 Intuitively, i decides about its slack in t, knowing that its slack in t + 1 will be the same as in t. Hence, deciding about slack in t and t + 1, rm i knows that P o t+2 and P x t+2 are equal to S i t+1 for all S x t+1 ≥ S i t+1 and S o t+1 ≥ S i t+1 respectively.
Accordingly, the only price in t + 2 that is changed as a consequence of the induced reduction of the slack of o and x to S o t+1 = S x t+1 = S i t+1 = S i t is the price that rm i 9 No rm can increase its slack in a steady state because of the break even constraint. 10 Derivatives would be greater than zero for further decreases of their slack though.
itself can charge in t + 2, P i t+2 . Further, R i 1 (S o t+1 , S x t+1 ) + R i 2 (S o t+1 , S x t+1 ) = 1 is always true under frontier yardstick regulation (see appendix) and therefore equation (25) reduces to
We consider unilateral reductions of the slack of i starting from a steady state so that R o 1 (S i t , S x t ) = 1. Furthermore, with J i 1 (P t+2 ) = 1 + λ i t+2 (Lemma 4 in the appendix) and F 2 (P i t , S i t ) = B − 1, it follows:
As the optimization problem is the same in every period in a steady state equilibrium, λ i t = λ i t+2 = λ. Solving for B yields the implicit solution for S * :
This condition summarizes the tradeo between marginal benets and marginal costs of decreasing slack. The less patient rm i is, so the more weight it puts on instantaneous payo, i.e. the smaller δ is, the greater is B and with B < 0 the smaller is the slack i chooses. Therefore, if δ decreases, the rm cares less about slack in the future but grasps prot today. A more detailed intuition based on an innite geometric series is given in the appendix. If λ > 0, the constraint must be binding from the complementary slackness conditions. For equation (28) to hold, the greater λ is, the greater must be B and, as B < 0, the smaller must be the slack. If the constraint is binding, rm i has to choose a smaller slack than it would otherwise do. Conversely, if λ is zero, the solution to the constrained maximization problem is equal to the solution to the unconstrained maximization problem, i.e. the slack S M * that rm i chooses in equilibrium if all prices are suciently high. Consequently, the implicit denition for S M * is given by 
Applying the same reasoning as above with S i t+1 = S i t = S * , J i 1 (P t+2 ) = 1 + λ i t+2 ,
and solving for B , it follows the implicit solution for S * :
Under average yardstick regulation, B also decreases in δ and hence the slack i chooses increases in the weight the rm puts on future payo. Again B increases in λ so the slack chosen if the constraint is binding is smaller than the slack chosen if all prices are suciently high. The solution to the corresponding unconstrained maximization problem, i.e. the slack S A * rm i chooses in equilibrium if all prices are suciently high, does not include λ. So, S A * is implicitly dened by
Inspection of equations (28) and (32) reveals that no slack higher than S M * and S A * can exist in a steady state under the respective regulatory regime. As B < 0 and λ is nonnegative from the complementary slackness conditions, neither (28) nor (32) could hold in any steady state with slack greater than S M * and S A * respectively.
In such a steady state, marginal benets of unilaterally reducing slack would be greater than marginal costs of doing so. Consequently, rm i would unilaterally deviate by reducing its slack, which contradicts the existence of such punishmentfree Markov-perfect steady state equilibria. This leads to the following proposition that is directly derived from the analysis above: Proposition 1.
(i) In any punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium under frontier yardstick regulation the slack is between 0 and S M * , S * [0, S M * ].
(ii) In any punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium under average yardstick regulation the slack is between 0 and S A * , S * [0, S A * ].
Steady state equilibria
From Lemma 1, it followed that there cannot exist any asymmetric steady state equilibrium. It is straightforward that the analysis above can analogously be done for rms o and x. Taking the optimal strategies of rms o and x as given, we show that it is optimal for i to follow the same strategy. By doing this, we prove the existence of the equilibria characterized above.
Assume optimal Markov-perfect strategies of rms o and x under frontier yardstick regulation are given by
So, rms o and x choose S M * or at least one rm j = i, o, x cannot choose any higher slack without violating the break even constraint given P t . In the latter case, this rm's choice of slack would remain optimal if the other rms chose higher slacks instead.
f i (P t ) = S * = min(S M * , P i t , P o t , P x t ) is the optimal strategy given the strategies of o and x. As min(S M * , P i t , P o t , P x t ) can take on every value between zero and S M * depending on initial prices, existence of a punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium under frontier yardstick regulation is established for every slack
Assume further that optimal strategies of rms o and x under average yardstick regulation are given by
With the same reasoning as above, it follows that if these strategies constitute an equilibrium, it is punishment-free. The strategies given by equations (34) and (35), dier only by the unique optimal value of slack, given prices are suciently high.
Accordingly the corresponding proof for average yardstick regulation is very similar to the one above. It is not optimal for rm i to choose a slack higher than the one o and x choose given their above strategies: First, note that under average yardstick regulation, all relevant derivatives of the regulatory rule are equal to 1 2 as every price is the average of the slacks of the other two rms of the period before. Now consider S i t > S o t = S x t : neither o nor x would choose a higher slack in t + 1 than in t as then min(P i t+1 , P o t+1 , P x t+1 ) = P i t+1 = S o t = S x t . It follows that the highest possible slack from t + 2 on would not be greater than S o t = S x t for all slacks S i t > S o t = S x t . As F 2 (P i t , S i t ) < 0, i could increase its instantaneous and intertemporal payo by decreasing its slack and choosing S i t = S o t = S x t . The rest of the proof is a straightforward repetition of the arguments above using S A * and the corresponding derivatives of the regulatory rule.
We summarize these ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
(i) Under frontier yardstick regulation, the triple of strategies
It is important to note that the regulator cannot induce the zero slack steady state by simply setting all prices to zero. In our analysis, necessary costs have been normalized to zero. However, the reason why regulatory schemes like yardstick regulation exist essentially is that the regulator does not know how large necessary costs of production are. Otherwise, she could directly mandate optimal prices without applying yardstick regulation. By exogenously setting too low prices in the rst regulatory period, the regulator risks rms going bankrupt, as they cannot break even anymore. While it is not explicitly modeled in this paper, it seems reasonable that it is crucial to the regulator that rms subject to regulation, producing without slack, can cover their real and necessary costs. One could think of a large welfare loss outside of the model that is associated with rms, that provide essential services, not being able to cover their real and necessary costs.
Given this restriction and that no slack higher than S M * and S A * under the respective regime can exist in a steady state, it seems reasonable that the regulator initially sets prices which are relatively high. Therefore, comparing the upper ends of the intervals of feasible steady state slacks seems particularly relevant.
Comparative dynamics
From Propositions 1 and 2, we know that every slack between 0 and S M * under frontier yardstick regulation and between 0 and S A * under average yardstick regulation can describe a steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, we know that there cannot exist punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibria with higher slack under the respective regulatory regime. By comparing the implicit solutions for S M * and S A * , we nd that all punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibria under average yardstick regulation can be equilibria under frontier yardstick regulation while the reverse is not true. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The highest slack that can be realized in a punishment-free Markovperfect steady state equilibrium is greater under frontier yardstick regulation than under average yardstick regulation. Proof. S A * is implicitly dened by (33) and the corresponding value under frontier yardstick regulation, S M * , is implicitly dened by (29). As B > 0 and B < 0, S M * > S A * if the following inequality holds:
Rearranging yields 1 > δ.
Hence, inequality (36) always holds.
Intuitively, orientation at the performance of`the best' of all other rms rather than the average of all other rms to dene constraints for a rm under yardstick regulation seems to be the tougher regulation. Incentives to produce eciently, i.e. without slack, should be strong. Proposition 3 questions this intuition. Using historical cost data of other rms allows each rm to inuence the own yardstick.
As this inuence is greater under frontier yardstick regulation all rms could be less willing to`push' the other rms because they will have to`push back' in return.
Conclusion
While Shleifer's (1985) version of yardstick regulation uses current performance of other rms to nd current constraints for an evaluated rm, real life applications of yardstick regulation frequently dene constraints, e.g. prices allowed to be charged, ex ante based on data from the regulatory period(s) before. This use of historical cost data in yardstick regulation enables a rm to aect the price it can charge in the future. Aecting other rms' constraints and thus behavior, the current performance of a rm is directly linked to its own future constraints.
This analysis showed in a simple model framework that inecient steady state equilibria in which all rms choose positive slack can exist under yardstick regulation without any form of collusion if historical cost data is used. Furthermore, the highest slack that can exist in a punishment-free Markov-perfect steady state equilibrium is higher under frontier yardstick regulation, where the rm with the lowest costs of all but the evaluated rm denes the yardstick, than if the average of all other rms is used. This challenges the perception that incentives to produce eciently are strongest if the best of all other rms is the yardstick in a yardstick regulation using historical cost data.
ulation and average yardstick regulation, the remaining is then a straightforward application along these lines.
Case (I):
If all three prices and all three slacks are the same in t the regulatory rule does not force any change. Prices in t + 1 are the same as in t and the same slack as in t is possible for all rms.
Frontier yardstick regulation
Case (II):
then either case (I) or one of the cases (II)-(V) applies.
Under frontier yardstick regulation, the price that a rm is allowed to charge is the minimum of the slacks the other two rms chose in the period before. Therefore, if rms i and o choose the same slack in t and rm x chooses a smaller one, the price i and o are allowed to charge in t + 1 is equal to S x t while P x t+1 is equal to the slack i and o choose in t. In t + 1, x may, consequently, choose any slack that is not greater than P x t+1 = S i t = S o t . The slack i and o can choose is not greater than P i t+1 = P o t+1 = S x t and hence smaller than P x t+1 = S i t = S o t . In t + 2, the price i, o and x may charge is not greater than the smallest slack in t, i.e. S x t . Only one rm,
x, can choose a higher slack than this in t + 1. But even if it does so, the smaller one of any two slacks chosen in t + 1 cannot be greater than S x t . In t + 2, either all three rms choose the same slack and this slack is equal to the price they may charge or one of the cases (II) to (V) applies.
Case (III):
Case (IV):
Case (V):
Average yardstick regulation
So the highest slack chosen in t cannot be chosen by anyone in t + 2. Then either case (I) or one of the cases (II)-(V) applies.
Under average yardstick regulation, the price that a rm may charge is equal to the average of the slacks that the other two rms chose in the period before. So, if rms i and o choose the same slack in t and rm x chooses a smaller slack, the price i and o are allowed to charge in t + 1 is smaller than the one x may charge and smaller than the slack i and o choose in t. Accordingly both have to choose a smaller slack in t + 1. In t + 1, x may choose a slack that is greater than S x t but not greater than the slack i and o choose in t. In t + 2, all prices are smaller than the greatest slack in t so that this slack cannot be chosen anymore. Then either all three rms choose the same slack and this slack is equal to the price they may charge or one of the cases (II) to (V) applies.
So the highest slack chosen in t cannot be chosen by anyone in t + 1. Then either case (I) or one of the cases (II)-(V) applies.
Then either case (I) or one of the cases (II)-(V) applies.
As long as slacks dier in period t, in t + 2 at the latest, the highest slack of t cannot be chosen by any rm anymore under both regulatory regimes. (Under frontier yardstick regulation, at the latest in t + 2, no slack higher than the smallest of t can be chosen.) Consequently, the maximum of the three slacks monotonically decreases, potentially with a delay that is not greater than two periods. Furthermore, all slacks are bounded below at zero. It follows that slacks necessarily have to converge. As the price for each rm is in every period the minimum or the average of the slacks of the other two rms in the period before, prices converge too. Prices and slacks cannot converge to dierent values so that prots of all rms must be zero in every steady state.
Derivatives of the regulatory rules

Frontier yardstick regulation
We focus on the example of the price rm i can charge in t + 1. The corresponding derivatives regarding reductions of slack for the other rms and for all other periods are found analogously. The regulatory rule is given by (4):
conditions must hold. Now, assume one of the other rms, e.g. rm o, instead chooses a marginally smaller slack in t so that P i t+1 = P x t+1 < P o t+1 and P i t+1 < S M * under frontier yardstick regulation and P i t+1 < S A * under average yardstick regulation. From the break even condition, we know that i has to reduce its slack by at least the marginal change of the price that it may charge in t + 1 so that the left hand side derivative of f i (P t+1 ) with respect to i's own price cannot be smaller than one. Clearly, the sum of the left hand side derivatives f i 1 (P t+1 ) + f i 3 (P t+1 ) ≥ 1 too. (Throughout this paper, we are only considering reductions of slack.)
As we require equilibria to be punishment-free, this equation holds with equality and S i t+1 = P i t+1 . To show this, we x the slacks o and x at their respective highest admissible value of slack in t + 1, S o t+1 = P o t+1 and S x t+1 = P x t+1 . Consequently, the respective left hand side derivatives of the regulatory rule for rm i are the same as in a steady state as i cannot choose a slack higher than its price and thus S i t+1 = min(S i t+1 , S o t+1 , S x t+1 ). If rm i decreases its slack by even more than the marginal change of its price to any S i t+1 < P i t+1 , the constraint is not binding in t + 1. It follows that λ i t+1 = 0 from the complementary slackness conditions. With S i t+1 < S i t , it also follows that F 2 (P i t+1 , S i t+1 ) > F 2 (P i t , S i t ) as F is strictly concave in slack. Besides, the value function is concave in the state variables so that J i 2 (P t+2 ) and J i 3 (P t+2 ) are not smaller than the corresponding derivatives in the initial steady state, where the FOC held, as prices are not greater than in that steady state. Hence, the FOC cannot hold in t + 1 so that S i t+1 is not the optimal choice of i. Thus, i does not unilaterally reduce its slack by more than what is forced by the reduction of its price in this setting, i.e. S i t+1 = P i t+1 .
We can apply the same reasoning as above for rms o and x to show that no rm unilaterally chooses a slack in t + 1 that is smaller than P i t+1 = P x t+1 if the other two rms choose their respective highest admissible slack here. As we require equilibria to be punishment-free, rms do not coordinatedly choose a uniform smaller slack because of other rms choosing this uniform slack. It follows that f i 1 (P t+1 ) + f i 3 (P t+1 ) = 1 in this setting.
Symmetrically the same reasoning applies for all rms with indices changed.
From the proof above, we can clearly point out the vulnerability of yardstick regulation against the threat of joint mutual punishment and collusion in general. As shown above, it is not optimal in this case for rm i to unilaterally choose any slack smaller than the price that it can charge in t+1. However, for example, if at least one other rm chose a smaller slack than this slack under frontier yardstick regulation, it would be optimal for i to do so too. As this applies for all rms, allowing for coordination like joint mutual punishment could lead to f i 1 (P t+1 ) + f i 3 (P t+1 ) > 1.
This would give room to equilibria with much higher slack than S M * under frontier yardstick regulation and S A * under average yardstick regulation by increasing costs of reducing slack for all rms. With δ < 1, it follows that 1 + δ · 1 = B 1 1 − δ .
Rearranging yields B = 1 − δ 2 , which replicates the implicit denition of S M * given by equation (29).
